Venezuela holds potentially the world’s largest oil reserves, yet their full exploitation remains unlikely in the short term. Here is what could realistically unfold.
After the US operation that resulted in the removal and arrest of Nicolás Maduro, Venezuelan oil has abruptly returned to the center of global attention. This renewed focus is not driven by any immediate structural change in production, but rather by the sheer scale and strategic relevance of Caracas’ hydrocarbon reserves.
Venezuela is, in fact, officially the country with the largest proven crude oil reserves in the world, estimated at around 303 billion barrels, accounting for roughly 18–19% of global reserves. This status is largely attributable to the extra-heavy crude deposits of the Orinoco Belt—difficult and costly to refine, yet strategically valuable for operators equipped with the appropriate technologies.
Despite this extraordinary resource base, actual output remains a fraction of its potential. By the end of 2025, Venezuelan crude oil production was estimated at between 900,000 and 1 million barrels per day, equivalent to roughly 1% of global supply, compared with more than 3 million barrels per day in the early 2000s and peak levels of approximately 3.45 million barrels per day in the 1990s.
This collapse is largely the result of US and Western sanctions imposed over the past decade, compounded by chronic underinvestment, technological deterioration, and systemic corruption. The mismanagement of PDVSA, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, offers a clear illustration of these structural failures.
In response, Caracas has increasingly redirected its crude exports toward China and other Asian buyers in recent years. It is therefore no coincidence that Maduro’s final diplomatic engagements were with senior Chinese representatives in the region shortly before his removal. Nor is it accidental that the US operation at the start of the year effectively delivered an indirect blow to Beijing’s energy strategy in Latin America.
What, then, are the implications for the oil market?
With Maduro out of the picture, Washington is expected to seek control over, regulation and redirection of Venezuelan oil flows toward Western—primarily US—refineries, in coordination with residual elements of the former political apparatus now aligned with American interests. As a result, the issuance of new, narrowly defined operating licenses appears likely, particularly for US firms such as Chevron, which already maintains a foothold in Venezuela at the expense of European competitors.
In this context, ENI’s presence in the country—despite its joint ventures with PDVSA—has been significantly curtailed by US sanctions. The Italian energy group is also reported to hold outstanding receivables amounting to several million dollars from PDVSA.
The Trump administration has made its objective explicit: to restore Venezuelan crude flows to refineries along the US Gulf Coast. Heavy, high-sulfur Venezuelan crude is well suited to the sophisticated refining complexes in the region, many of which were originally engineered to process precisely this type of feedstock. Re-establishing these supply chains would help lower refining costs and strengthen US energy security.
That said, bringing meaningful volumes back to market will take time. Operational recovery would require years and substantial capital expenditure, with some estimates running into the tens of billions of dollars, alongside the establishment of a stable legal, regulatory, and infrastructural framework.
From a market perspective, even the prospect of Venezuelan barrels returning has already influenced pricing dynamics. The spread between WTI—the US benchmark—and Brent has widened, indicating that markets are beginning to price in the possibility of additional supply entering the Western hemisphere.
For Italy, where gasoline and diesel prices are closely tied to Brent benchmarks and Mediterranean refining margins, the implications are ambiguous. On the one hand, increased availability of heavy crude on global markets could exert downward pressure on retail fuel prices, provided supply growth is not offset by new geopolitical disruptions. On the other, the US intervention risks triggering fresh diplomatic tensions, maritime seizures, and legal disputes—already evident in the detention of tankers bound for Asia—thereby amplifying volatility. Overall, tangible effects on household portfolios are likely to remain limited.
Ultimately, the primary beneficiaries of the operation are the United States. Washington is reinforcing its energy sphere of influence across the Americas, shaping a de facto “Pan-American” resource bloc in which raw materials, supply chains, and financial flows remain under US control. The broader consequence, however, is a further widening of the geopolitical rift between the United States and much of the rest of the world.
Original article published on Money.it Italy 2026-01-15 06:41:46. Original title: Venezuela, il vero bottino dietro il blitz USA
