Russia looks East: Putin’s “Pivot to Asia”

The war in Ukraine, tensions with the European Union and the United States, and the economic sanctions of the Western bloc are just some of the causes that pushed Russia away from the West. Unable to do business with EU governments, once wealthy clients to whom it sold gas and oil, Moscow was forced to turn its gaze elsewhere: to the East, namely Asia, on the new economic engine of the world.

In any case, if Vladimir Putin will be able to decipher the context, then it is to be believed that the Russian Federation will somehow be able to forget that it is partially Western, discovering that it is only and exclusively Asian. In reality, already in 2014, following the first wave of Western sanctions in response to the annexation of Crimea, Putin started his very personal Pivot to the East (povorot na vostok).

That strategy aimed to move the Russian economy away from European partners in the direction of Beijing. Despite a mild economic recession in both countries that interrupted the strategy in 2015, the reorientation succeeded quite well. The two economies began to integrate significantly. China’s share of Russia’s total trade thus grew from around 10% in 2013 to 18% by the end of 2021. Then there was the start of the "special military operation" in Ukraine and Moscow’s Pivot to the East came back.

What if Putin looks to the East

Russia’s offensive in Ukraine in 2022, as well as the G7 sanctions imposed as punishment, have accelerated Moscow’s rapprochement with Beijing. While Russia’s economic reorientation has focused primarily on trade in goods, particularly fossil fuels, it is important to highlight how the Russian Federation’s financial relations have undergone a parallel change.

The think tank Atlantic Council pointed out that the Russian economy is now heavily dependent on Chinese capital. While this may have turned out to be favorable for the Kremlin – and prevented its collapse – in the long run, excessive dependence on Chinese finance will showcase the Russian government’s status as a minority partner in relations between the two countries.

Furthermore, in 2015, Russia and China agreed to harmonize their respective fundamental projects: the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The EEU seeks to establish a new regulatory and customs system while the BRI is more oriented towards improving connectivity between Beijing and the Eurasian plus African continent through a mammoth infrastructure network.

Some argue that Sino-Russian convergence could push Beijing to erode Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence in Central Asia. In reality, Chinese economic penetration in this area is doing nothing but strengthening local governments, reducing the risk of possible revolutions throughout the post-Soviet space. In short, as regards the most pressing and relevant aspects, the "Asianisation" of Russia, and the consequent complementarity of Russia and China in Asia, does not appear to be harmful either for the Kremlin or for Beijing.

Moscow put to the test

Among the main objectives of Russia’s foreign agenda, we find three relevant points: the development of parallel partnerships with China and India, the search for regional stability in the Asia-Pacific (a term the Russians prefer to adopt instead of Indo-Pacific) and the support of Asian regional multilateral institutions, including Asean and its various formats.

In 2021, Putin explained that the shift of the "center of gravity of world politics and economics" to the Asia-Pacific area required Russia to continue "vigorously developing relations with the countries" of the region, to create the Great Eurasian Partnership. Furthermore, Asia is home to Russia’s new main partners, China and India, both hungry for Putin’s precious energy resources. This is why, quite simply, Putin will increasingly look towards the East.

Original article published on Money.it Italy 2024-03-21 10:01:00. Original title: La Russia guarda verso l’Oriente: il “Pivot to Asia” di Putin