Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated Europe’s defence spending, but higher budgets alone will not create a stronger European military posture without deeper industrial integration and common procurement. According to NATO estimates, European allies and Canada spent more than $500 billion on defence in 2024, a figure that has increased significantly since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. While in 2024 the EU allocated €300 million to five joint defence-procurement projects, a sign that Brussels is trying to turn coordination into practice rather than rhetoric, this figure is still low compared to military spending elsewhere.
Yet despite this spending, Europe still struggles to act as a unified military power. The problem is not necessarily a lack of money but a lack of integration. Europe’s defence market remains fragmented: member states still buy separately, follow different national rules, and often protect domestic suppliers, which keeps production small, duplicated, and expensive.
This fragmentation generates inefficiencies and duplication, making it more difficult and expensive to equip European armed forces. The war in Ukraine has highlighted these weaknesses, exposing shortages of ammunition and revealing the limitations of Europe’s defence production capacity.
Why Brussels Wants a European Defence Industry
The push for a stronger European defence industry is driven by more than military considerations. For Brussels, defence has increasingly become an issue of economic security and industrial competitiveness. European policymakers argue that the continent cannot remain heavily dependent on external suppliers for critical defence capabilities. The war in Ukraine and disruptions to global supply chains have reinforced the idea that strategic industries require greater resilience and autonomy.
Besides also historically contributing to major technological developments that later found civilian applications, a stronger defence industry can generate economic benefits beyond security itself. Increased investment could support high-skilled employment, strengthen supply chains, and improve Europe’s technological competitiveness at a time when the continent faces growing competition from both the United States and China.
The Obstacles: National Interests and Political Divisions
Despite growing political momentum, building a genuine European defence industry remains extremely difficult. The main obstacles are political rather than financial.
Defence is one of the most sensitive areas of national sovereignty. Governments often prefer to support domestic manufacturers, both for economic reasons and because defence production is closely linked to national security interests. As a result, member states continue to pursue national procurement strategies that can conflict with broader European objectives. Despite this, Europe already has examples of cross-border industrial cooperation, but these remain the exception rather than the rule in defence procurement and production.
Different strategic cultures also complicate cooperation. Countries in Eastern Europe generally perceive Russia as an immediate security threat and have strongly supported increased defence spending. Other member states have traditionally adopted different strategic priorities and have been more cautious about defence integration.
Relations with the United States represent another source of division. Although European leaders increasingly speak of “strategic autonomy”, many governments continue to view NATO and the United States as indispensable security partners. Several European countries have recently purchased American military equipment, illustrating the continued attractiveness of US defence systems and the difficulties facing efforts to create a truly integrated European market.
These divisions raise an important question: can Europe establish a common defence industry while member states remain reluctant to relinquish control over one of the core functions of the modern state?
A Defence Union in the Making?
Although a fully integrated European defence industry remains a distant objective, meaningful progress is taking place. Since 2022, the EU has moved from general appeals for cooperation to specific instrumentssuch as EDIRPA, EDIS, and EDIP, all designed to encourage joint procurement, rebuild production capacity, and strengthen the competitiveness of the European defence industrial base.
The European Defence Fund seeks to promote cooperation among companies and governments, while recent initiatives aim to expand production capacity, particularly in areas such as ammunition and missile systems. The broader political environment has also changed. Defence cooperation, once considered politically difficult, is increasingly regarded as a strategic necessity.
Whether these initiatives ultimately lead to a genuine European defence industry remains uncertain. Europe possesses the financial resources, technological capabilities, and industrial expertise necessary to become a major defence producer. Yet the success of the project will depend less on economic capacity than on political will. Building a European defence industry requires not only more spending but also a willingness to coordinate procurement, share industrial responsibilities, and accept greater collective decision-making.
The debate surrounding European defence is therefore about far more than weapons and military capabilities. It concerns the future of European integration itself. In an increasingly unstable international environment, the question is no longer whether Europe needs stronger defence capabilities. The real question is whether European governments are prepared to build them together.
